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Abstract 
Economic analysis of emission permit markets, and particularly of the initial permit 
allocation, have concentrated largely on static approaches. This is somewhat unsatisfactory as 
the allocation method in subsequent commitment periods may influence the behaviour of the 
market participants in the current period. For instance, some advocate a system of “rolling 
grandfathering”, in which later period allocations would be based on the actual (rather than 
allotted) emissions in earlier periods. Alternatively, emission permits can be allocated on the 
basis of the distance between actual and desired emission intensities in previous periods. This 
paper analyses the dynamic aspects of allocating greenhouse gas emission rights for different 
approaches using multi-player/two-period models. We show that different future allocation 
approaches create different strategic incentives at present, and that the permit market may 
partially or completely offset these incentives. We also demonstrate under what circumstances 
dynamic allocation rules create incentives to (lobby for) accelerating or decelerating emission 
reduction paths. Allowing for intertemporal transfer of abatement activities (banking and 
borrowing), the net present costs can be reduced. However, whether banking or borrowing is 
beneficial for a company depends not only on their own abatement costs and that of other 
companies trading permits on the market, but also on the allocation mechanism implemented. 
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  11 Introduction 
Much has been said and written about markets of emission permits, and this is particularly 
true for the initial allocation of emission permits (see e.g. Woerdman, 2000; or Harrison and 
Radov, 2002). In a sense, emission permits are property rights and introducing them has 
implications for the distribution of wealth. However much attention has been paid to the 
initial allocation, there is little attention to the allocation of permits in later periods – and less 
to the effect this may have on the behaviour of the market in earlier periods. This paper seeks 
to fill this gap. 
We set up an analytically tractable model of an emission permit market, for concreteness 
referring to the market of carbon dioxide, and contrast three dynamic allocation rules and two 
mechanisms to steer overall emission reduction. The first dynamic allocation rule is in fact 
static: Allocations depend on emissions in the period before emission reduction. The other 
two rules are truly dynamic. In one, allocations depend on actual emission in the previous 
period. In the other, allocations depend on the emission reduction effort in the previous 
period. We also contrast the situation in which the regulator sets the overall emission target 
with the situation in which the regulator sets the price of emission reduction. In a static model, 
the two strategies are equivalent (under perfect information but not under uncertainty, see 
Weitzman, 1974). However, in a dynamic model, they are not. Furthermore, we investigate 
the effect that banking and borrowing may have on the above. 
Various authors have addressed problems of the initial allocation of emission permits. 
Woerdman (2000), for example, analyses the issue of permit allocation as a major political 
barrier to establish an (inter)national emissions trading scheme. Holmes and Friedman (2000) 
present different design alternatives for a domestic trading scheme in the U.S. Viguier (2001) 
discusses diverse allocations of emission allowances across Member States of the European 
Union. Woerdman (2001) considers under which conditions European differences in domestic 
permit allocation procedures will lead to competitive distortions (see also OECD, 1999; 
Zhang, 1999) and result in state aid. Most recently, Cramton and Kerr (2002) analysed the 
distributional implications of allocating CO2 permits through auctions. Mindful of political 
economy problems they argue that auctioning is superior to grandfathering. Harrison and 
Radov (2002) evaluate the different allocation mechanism for the European Union. 
Approaches using numerical simulations to evaluate methods of allocating permits have 
largely concentrated on static approaches. Edwards and Hutton (2001) use a computable 
general equilibrium model to assess different allocation methods for the UK. Burtraw et al. 
(2002) apply an electricity market simulation model to compare three different allocation 
mechanism for the US. Others including pre-existing distortions in their analysis for the U.S. 
are Goulder et al. (1999).  
All analysis find that auctioning the permits and using the revenue to reduce distorting taxes 
are the cheaper method compared to grandfathering or output-based allocation. Burtraw et al. 
(2002) discover that auctioning might even be preferable to owners of existing generation 
assets. However, Stavins (1998) points out that wherever tradable permits have been adopted, 
the initial allocation of permits has always been through grandfathering rather than through 
other methods. These findings are supported by Schwarze and Zapfel (2000) who stress the 
conflict between efficiency and political acceptability. They investigated on the design of the 
two most prominent U.S. cap-and-trade programs (US EPA Sulfur Allowance Trading 
Program and South Californian Regional Clean Air Incentives Market (RECLAIM). 
According to the EU Directive (EU Commission, 2003) for establishing a community wide 
emissions trading, 95 per cent of the allowances shall be allocated free of charge for the first 
commitment period. 
  2Our paper is different. We investigate the effect of different dynamic permit allocation 
approaches on the behaviour of the market. Dynamic allocation obviously interact with 
trading over time, better known as banking and borrowing, which we consider explicitly. To 
our knowledge, only two other studies take into account dynamic effects of permit allocation. 
Böhringer and Lange (2003) show that dynamic allocation schemes as discussed here cannot 
be optimal, but they also derive conditions for second-best dynamic allocations. They 
consider emission-based allocations, which corresponds to our rolling grandfathering, and 
output-based allocations, which corresponds to our technology standards. Böhringer and 
Lange do not investigate the permit market in detail, as we do in this paper. Jensen and 
Rasmussen (2000) use a dynamic multi-sectoral model of the Danish economy to investigate 
the effects of different allocation approaches on welfare, CO2 leakage, employment and 
stranded costs. They compare auctioning to grandfathering and an output-based allocation 
depending on a company’s market share. In neither Jensen and Rasmussen (2000) nor 
Böhringer and Lange (2003) intertemporal transfer of permits is considered. We contrast and 
compare two alternative dynamic allocation approaches (rolling grandfathering and 
technology standards) and include intertemporal transfer of permits in the analysis.  
Although banking and/or borrowing are an integral part of most policy programs, it is only 
recently that economists started to formally investigate its aspects. Theoretical analysis are 
e.g. Cronshaw and Kruse (1996) who examine a competitive intertemporal model for 
bankable emission permits. Rubin (1996) uses a continuous time model of banking and 
borrowing and derives permit prices and emission paths. Kling and Rubin (1997) use a similar 
framework to examine the efficiency properties of a permit banking system. The results 
indicate that allowing banking reduces the costs of emission reduction. However, Kling and 
Rubin (1997) found firms choosing excessive damage and output levels in early periods in a 
system allowing for banking and borrowing. Extending their analysis to include stock 
pollutants, Leiby and Rubin (2001) show that environmental regulation can achieve the 
socially optimal level of emissions. Godby et al. (1997) extend the analysis to uncertainty in 
the control of emissions. In an experimental setting they find banking improving price 
stability substantially. Steenberghe (2002) analysis the effect of banking under the Kyoto 
Protocol on the world emissions, abatements costs and the permit price for different scenarios. 
Hagem and Westskog (1998) explore the optimal design of an intertemporal trading system 
with banking and borrowing under market imperfections. None of the above mentioned 
analyses combine dynamic permit allocation approaches with intertemporal transfer of 
permits. 
The paper is structured as follows: Sections 2 starts with a stylised model of a two period 
market for tradable permits. Section 3 extends the model to include different emission 
allocation approaches: rolling grandfathering and technology standards. Section 4 contrasts a 
policy based on quantities (as in Sections 2, 3, 5 and 6) with a policy based on prices. Sections 
5 and 6 introduce intertemporal banking and borrowing of emission permits, and examine the 
consequences for the different permit allocation approaches. Section 7 concludes. 
  32 The market 
Let us consider a two-period market for tradable permits with I companies. Permits cannot be 
transferred between periods. Emission reduction costs C are quadratic (this, restrictive, 
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R is emission reduction; α is a parameter; δ is the discount rate; P denotes the amount of 
emission permits bought or sold; π is the emission permit price; assuming a perfect market, all 
companies face the same price; E are the emissions; A are the allocated emission permits; that 
is, if a company emits more than has been allocated, E>A, it will have to reduce emissions or 
buy permits on the market. 
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where λ denotes the LaGrange multiplier. Note the Hotelling nature of (2b). This is a system 
with 6I equations and 6I+2 unknowns, but we also have 



















































So, the permit price goes up if the emission reduction obligation increases or if the costs of 
emission reduction increase. All companies face the same marginal costs of emission 
reduction, and the trade-off between reducing emissions in-house and buying or selling 
permits is driven by the ratio of marginal emission reduction costs and the permit price. As 
there is no banking and borrowing, the markets in the two periods are independent and the 
discount rate does not influence the result. The modelled market behaves as expected. 
Rehdanz and Tol (2002) consider the special case I=2 for one period only. 
  43 Dynamic allocation 
 
3.1 Alternative allocations 
Let us assume that the emission reduction obligations in the first period are based on 
grandfathering. For example, all companies should reduce a fixed percentage τ (with 0< τ<1) 
of their emissions E in period 0, Ai,1=Ei,0-(1-τ1)Ei,0=τ1Ei,0.
1 
The second period is more interesting. In (1), we assume that the emission allocation in period 
2 is independent of what happens in period 1. For instance, the allocation may be based on the 
emissions of period 0, Ai,2=τ2Ei,0. In the long run, a system of “fixed grandfathering” based on 
the period before emission reduction policies, may lead to substantial redistributions, as the 
emission allocation gets more and more out of step with actual emissions. It is therefore likely 
that the emission allocation in the second period somehow reflects the reality of period 1 
rather than period 0. 
One way in which this may happen is through a system of “rolling grandfathering” (or 
perhaps “updated grandfathering”), that is, emission allocation in period 2 are based on the 
actual emissions in period 1. That is, Ai,2=τ2(Ei,1-Ri,1).
2 In words, the emission reduction 
obligation in period 2 falls with emission reduction in period 1, or the more one reduces now, 
the more one has to reduce in the future. There would be less of an incentive to reduce 
emissions as it would only reduce the amount of permits receiving in the future. This was 
recently discussed by Harrison and Radov (2002). 
Alternatively, emission allocations may shift away from grandfathering to technology 
standards. Such standards could be based on the emission intensity of the companies. Suppose 
that the emission allocation is based on the best available, commercially proven technology. 
That is, emission allocations are based on some fixed percentage of potential emissions (those 
emissions that would have been had the company used the best technology), except for the 
technology leader, whose allocation is based on actual emissions. Without loss of generality, 
assume that, in period 0, all companies are the same size and have a turnover of unity; further 
assume that they all have equal emissions (and hence emission intensities) as well, but 
different abatement costs. The emission allocation could then be something like Ai,2=τ2(Ei,1-
Rmax,1+Ri,1). In words, the emission reduction obligation in period 2 falls with emission 
reduction in period 1, or the more one reduces now, the less one has to reduce in the future. 
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1 Emission allocations could also be based on a company’s share in the total emissions cap. If the total cap is also 
based on emissions in period 0, τ would be replaced by another constant, leaving the analysis unaffected. 
2 Emission allocations could also be based on a company’s share in the total emissions cap. The τ would then not 
be constant, but a function of total emission reduction in period 1 (which is a constant) and the company’s 
contribution to that (which is a decision variable). This would complicate the notation and the analysis without 
adding much insight; we in fact suspect that the two cases are equivalent.  
  5The first order conditions are: 
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Note that, for period 2, the first order conditions are the same as (2). In period 2, the target is 



































Note that solution (6) is identical to (3a) for τ2=0. 
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The first order conditions are (5b-f), while (5a) changes to 
(5a’’) 
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Again, (6’) is identical to (3a) for τ2=0. The first element of the RHS of (6) and (6’) is 
identical to (3a), so we see that rolling grandfathering (technology standards) increases 
(decrease) the price of carbon permits. This reflects the fact that there is a penalty (premium) 
for selling permits. 
  6However, the price increase is exactly compensated by the second element of the RHS of 
(5a’) and (5a’’). For every company, emission reduction and therefore net permit trade in 
period one is unaffected. This is because trade in emission permits is a zero-sum game. 
Figure 1 illustrates this. With rolling grandfathering, a company would be prepared to pay 
more for emission permits, as this would increase its emission allotment in the second period; 
the demand curve shifts upwards. At the same time, a company would demand a higher price 
for permits sold, as this would decrease its emission allocation in the second period; the 
supply curve shifts upwards too. The result is that the same amount is traded in period one, 
but at a higher price. The reverse happens with technology standards. Both supply and 













Figure 1. Demand and supply of permits in period 1 for a static allocation (solid lines) and 
two alternative forms of dynamic allocation, viz. rolling grandfathering (RG) and technology 
standards (TS). 
Something similar happens in the second period. The permit price only depends on the total 
emission allocation of all companies put together. The emission reductions of each company 
only depend on the price. So, if rolling grandfathering and technology standards lead to the 
same total allocation of emission permits, the emission reduction of each company is 
unaffected. However, as the initial allocation is different, emission permit trade is affected. As 
a result, the costs of companies are different in both periods, although the total costs are again 
unaffected. Rolling grandfathering and technology standards have a distributional effect only. 
This is a reflection of the Coase (1960) Theorem. 
 
3.2 A numerical illustration 
The points made above are easily understood with a numerical analysis. Let us assume that 
there are 5 companies of equal size. Each company emits 20 tC in both period 1 and period 2. 
In period 1, the emission allocation is 19 tC; in period 2, the emission allocation is 18.50 tC. 
That is, emission reduction is 5% in the first period and 7.25% in the second (compared to 
period 0). The firms differ in emission reduction costs. For firm i, αi,1=0.01(1+i). In the 
second period, αi,2=0.01i. 
  7Figure 2 shows emission reductions in the first period, without trade and with. The firms are 
ordered by emission reduction costs. Trade in emission permits makes that firms with low 
(high) abatement costs do more (less). 
Figure 3 shows emission reductions in the second period, without trade and with. Under static 
allocation, all firms have the same obligations, as they had identical emissions in period 0. 
Under rolling grandfathering, the firms that bought permits in the first period have a higher 
allocation (a lower emission reduction obligation). Under a technology standard, the firms 
that sold permits have a higher allocation. The total emission reduction is the same under the 
three rules. After trade, emission reduction efforts are the same. 
Figure 4 shows the net present value of the emission reduction costs, with a 5% discount rate. 
Trade reduces the costs for all firms under all three dynamic allocation rules. As expected, 
companies with very high or low abatement costs benefit most from trade. The net present 
costs are identical for the three allocation rules.
3 The changes in the permit price in the first 
period along with the number of traded permits traded in the second period and the emission 
reduction obligations in the second period offset each other. Compared to a static allocation 
the permit price in the first period is higher (lower), the total number of traded permits is 
lower (higher) and the emission reduction obligations for companies with low abatement costs 
is higher (lower) under rolling grandfathering (technology standard). The intuition behind the 
fact that net present costs are the same is that the total emission reduction effort is the same, 









































Figure 2. Emission reduction with and without trade in the first period. 
                                                 
3 This is a numerical result that is independent of the parameter and target choices. We have not been able to 
demonstrate this analytically. The problem is that optimal emission reduction in period one depends on the 
permit prices in both periods, while the permit price in the first period depends on the permit price in the second 
period, and the permit price in the second period depends on the sum of emission reductions in the first period. 
In order to make sure that the total emission reduction of the two periods is equal to that of the static allocation, 
τ2 also depends on the emission reduction in the first period. Substituting all this in the equation for (say) optimal 
emission reduction in period 1, a system of simultaneous quadratic equations in R1 results, with very elaborate 
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Figure 3. Allocation of emission reduction obligations in the second period according to three 
alternative rules (static allocation, rolling grandfathering, technology standard), and emission 
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Figure 4. The net present costs of emission reduction without trade and with. 
 
4 Price versus quantity controls 
So far, we assumed that the regulator fixes the total amount of emissions in both periods, and 
we looked at different ways of allocation that to firms. However, it may be that the regulator 
is rather interested in the costs of emission reduction. This may be because the regulator 
follows a cost-benefit analysis in setting the emission reduction standard. But even if the 
regulator has a fixed emission target in mind, uncertainty may lead the regulator to steer on 
price rather than quantity (Weitzman, 1974; Pizer, 2002). For this reason, many have 
  9suggested that a tradable permit system should include a “safety valve” (Pizer, 1999; Jacoby 
and Ellerman, 2004, McKibben and Wilcoxen, 1997), as indeed the Danish market has 
(Danish Electricity Supply Act, Act No. 375 of 2 June 1999). 
The price observed by the regulator is the permit price. Under rolling grandfathering (a 
technology standard), the permit price is higher (lower) than the price under static allocation 
in the first period; the regulator over(under)regulates, and would be induced to release more 
(less) permits. Comparing (3a) to (6) and solving for the τ in (6) shows how the difference in 



























where τ1 is the original allocation and τ1* is the new allocation that assures that the permit 
price takes the same value as it would have under the static allocation rule. Under rolling 
grandfathering (technology standard) τ1* would be smaller (greater) compared to a static 
allocation. That is, total emission reduction obligations in period one would be smaller 
(greater) under rolling grandfathering (technology standard).  
Figure 5 illustrates this, using the same numerical model as above. The emission reduction 
obligations deviate substantially compared to a system of static allocation. Under rolling 
grandfathering they decrease while they increase for the technology standard. With respect to 
the net present costs, the effect is stronger for the technology standard than for rolling 
grandfathering. The reason is that firms under (over) supply the market with permits under 
rolling grandfathering (technology standards); they are on a steeper (shallower) part of the 
emission reduction cost function and a small change in the emission reduction obligation has 
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Figure 5. Emission reduction obligation and effort in period 1. 
 
  10The implications of steering on price rather than quantity are as follows. The more lenient 
target under rolling grandfathering would primarily benefit the companies with high emission 
reduction costs, and may hurt the companies with low emission reduction costs. Overall, costs 
would be lower, though. The stricter target under a technology standard would lead to overall 
higher costs, but companies with low emission reduction costs may benefit. The broader 
implication of the above analysis is that, in a dynamic permit allocation scheme, the price of 
permits in any period does not just signal the emission reduction costs in that period, but also 
incorporates information from later periods. The permit price is therefore harder to interpret 
and less useful information to policy. 
 
5 Banking and borrowing 
Banking and borrowing allow a company to transfer abatement activities over time, forward 
in time through banking and backward through borrowing. Excess emissions rights can be 
saved for future use or present emissions can be extended for future abatement. As a result, 
the permit price becomes arbitraged over time. Whether companies choose to bank or borrow 
permits depends on the price of the first period compared to a later period. If e.g. the permit 
price in the first period is expected to be lower compared to the second period, companies 
would bank permits, increasing the price in the first period and decreasing the price in the 
second period, until the permit price is balanced over the two periods. This is beneficial to all 
companies regardless if it is a permit selling or buying company. The cost saving potential is 
higher for high abatement cost companies compared to the others.  
We assume that companies can freely choose to bank or borrow permits, but there is a carbon 
interest factor β>1. In a market with permit banking and borrowing equation (1) changes to: 
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Pt ,1 ,2 i B B = . Bi,1 is borrowing; if Bi,1 is negative it is banking.  
 
First order conditions (10) are (2a), (2b) and (2d), while (2c) changes to 
(10c) 
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(10) solves as (3b), while (3a) changes to: 
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  11At the company level, permits borrowed Bi,t and permits bought Pi,t are perfect substitutes, 
and therefore not determined. However, the total amount borrowed is: 
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As expected, Equation (11a) says that if there is net borrowing (banking), the price in the first 
period is lower (higher), and the price in the second period is higher (lower). (11e) says that 
there is net borrowing (ΣBi,1>0) if the emission reduction obligation, normalized by the 
emission reduction costs, in the first period is large relative to the emission reduction in the 
second period, corrected for the discount factor and the interest rate on borrowed carbon. 
In a system with rolling grandfathering or technology standards the implications are different 
and depend on the emission reduction obligations in later periods. For rolling grandfathering 
and intertemporal transfer of permits equation (1) changes to:
4 
(12)  1212, 1, 2
2
,2 ,2 2 i,2 2
,1 ,1 1 i,1 ,1 ,1 ,1 ,1 ,, ,,,
,2 ,2 ,2 ,2
min +  s.t.  ;
11 iiiii i
ii
ii i i i ii i RRPPBB
ii i ii
RP



















Pt ,1 ,2 ii B B = ,  1 β ≥  and  ,2 2 ,1 ,1 () ii AE R i τ = −  
 








,1 ,1 ,2 ,1
11 2
2
,1 ,2 ,2 11
11 (1 )(1 ) 22
11 (2 ) ( 1 ) 22
()
1




















































                                                
 
 
In contrast to a system of static allocation (11e), Equation (13e) says that there is net 
borrowing if emission reduction obligations in later periods are large (0<τ2<1) relative to the 
first period. Borrowing permits reduces emission reduction obligations in that particular 
period and increases the number of permits allocated in the next period. 
 
4 The first order conditions and the solutions are given in the appendix. 
  12For technology standards and intertemporal transfer of permits equation (1) changes to:
5 
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Analogous to a system of rolling grandfathering (13e) equation (13e’) says that there is net 
borrowing if emission reduction obligations in later periods are large (0<τ2<1) relative to the 
first period. Unlike (13e) the total amount of net borrowed permits is smaller as the emission 
reduction of the technology leader (Rmax,1) are subtracted.  
Note that, under a dynamic allocation system, intertemporal transfer of permits allows 
companies to reduce their emission reduction obligations in future periods. The total emission 
reduction achievement will be lower than the previously defined target. To achieve the same 
emission reduction target, the regulator has to lower τ2 and hence increase emission reduction 
obligations. This has effects on the intertemporal transfer of permits. 
Using the numerical example of Section 3.2 and setting τ2 such that total emission reduction 
obligations are the same for all approaches the intertemporal transfer of permits under static 
allocation is almost zero (0.4tC).
6 For rolling grandfathering, borrowing permits is in general 
more favourable. The total amount of borrowed permits is 4.5tC. This amount is almost 
identical to the total emissions that have to be reduced (5 tC) in the first period. Under a 
system of technology standards, banking becomes more favourable. The calculated total 
amount of banked permits is 1.5tC. In general, net permit borrowing becomes less attractive 
the lower the regulator sets τ2 and the more ambitious the emission reduction obligations of 
future periods are. If τ2 takes a certain value, net banking becomes more favourable. This is 
true for all allocation approaches. In our numerical example the regulator has to set τ2=0.93 
for rolling grandfathering and τ2=0.88 under a technology standard to achieve the same 
overall emission reductions.  
 
 
                                                 
5 The first order conditions and the solutions are given in the appendix. 
6 We set β=1. 
  13At the company level the implications might be different. Depending on the dynamic 
allocation scheme, a companies’ abatement costs and the permit price both banking or 
borrowing might be beneficial. To analyse this at the company level, the dynamic allocation 
scheme and intertemporal transfer of permits need to be solved simultaneously. This is 
impossible in our model, as both arbitrage the permit price over time and buying or borrowing 
permits are perfect substitutes. In the next section, we therefore constrain the amount of 
intertemporal transferred permits. If the constraint is not binding, there is no solution (see 
above). We therefore assume that the constraint is binding. 
 
6 Constrained banking and borrowing 
We assume that banking and borrowing is restricted to a fraction γ of the emission reduction 
obligation (Ei,t-Ai,t) of the particular period. The company can freely choose to bank permits 
up to their emission reduction obligations. Borrowing is restricted exogenously by the 
regulator. The prices of the two periods might not be equalized if the regulator restricts 
banking or borrowing such that no more permits can be transferred intertemporally in order to 
comply to the regulator. This would decrease companies’ costs less. 
In a market with restricted banking and borrowing equation (9) changes to:
7 
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The results for rolling grandfathering are similar to those obtained in Section 5. If emission 
reduction obligations in later periods are large (0<τ2<1) relative to the first period it is rational 
for all companies to borrow the maximum amount of permits allowed regardless of the permit 
price in the different periods.  
In a system of technology standards with Ai,2=τ2(Ei,1- Rmax,1 +Ri,1) this is only true for 
companies with high abatement cost. The technology leader and companies with very low 
abatement costs could reduce their emission reduction obligation only little. Also, they would 
sell less permits. Those companies might prefer a pure system of banking which would 
increase the costs for the high cost companies. This is not rational for high abatement cost 
companies. Therefore, companies with low abatement costs have three different options for 
minimizing their emission reduction costs. They could bank permits, borrow permits or have 
no intertemporal transfer of permits.  
As companies simultaneously choose the amount of permits to be borrowed, the intertemporal 
transfer of permits by one company has effects not only on the abatement costs of that 
company, but via the permit market on that of all other companies. Although borrowing 
permits might generally be beneficial for all companies, this might no longer be true if all 
companies would start borrowing permits at the same time. Figure 6 illustrates this by 
comparing the effects of borrowing permits to a system where no intertemporal transfer is 
allowed. Displayed are the net present costs using the same numerical example as in Section 
3.2. The total emission reduction obligations are the same for all approaches. The net present 
                                                 
7 The first order conditions and the solution is given in the appendix. The equations for both dynamic allocation 
schemes, the first order conditions and the solutions are given in the appendix. 
  14costs for the three different allocation approaches are identical (see Figure 4). Borrowing is 
restricted to γ=0.5 and identical for all companies, β=1. 
Referring to the results obtained in Section 5, Figure 6 shows that borrowing permits is not 
beneficial for all companies. Companies with high abatement costs would be worse off 
regardless of the allocation system.
8 A company with low abatement costs would borrow as 
much as possible as this reduces costs. Under a system of rolling grandfathering, the emission 
reduction obligations for this company are smaller and it could sell more permits on the 
market. This reduces costs compared to banking or a system where no intertemporal transfer 
is allowed. Under a system of technology standards, the same company would have to reduce 
more emissions relative to a system of no intertemporal transfer. Also, they would sell less 
permits on the market, but at a higher price. This reduces costs. For a company with high 



























Trade Trade with Borrowing
 
Figure 6. The net present costs of emission reduction with and without intertemporal transfer 
(γ=0.50). The total emission reduction obligations are the same for all scenarios. 
So far, we have assumed that all companies borrow the same percentage of their emission 
reduction obligations. If companies choose differently between banking and borrowing, the 
net present costs alter. Figure 7 illustrates this. Both company 1 and 2 borrow permits (γ=0.2) 
whereas the other companies have no intertemporal transfer (γ=0). Borrowing permits is 
rational for company 1 and 2 only under rolling grandfathering. They would start banking 
permits under a technology standard (Figure 7 would be inverted; results not shown).
9 The 
other companies could bank permits (possible option under rolling gradfathering ), borrow 
permits (possible option under a technology standard). However, their net present costs would 
                                                 
8 If τ1 = τ2 (this is all companies have to reduce the same fixed percentage of their emissions of the previous 
period) it is rational for all companies under rolling grandfathering to borrow the maximum amount of permits 
allowed regardless of the permit price in the different periods. Under a system of technology standards, the net 
present cost of the technology leader are always higher compared to a system where banking and borrowing is 
not allowed. Less permits would be sold at a lower price. This reduces the income from permit trading and 
reduces costs less. However, banking permits is also not rational for a company with low abatement costs, as it 
raises the loss from (inter-)national trade further. 
9 The net present costs for companies 1 and 2 would lie in between those obtained for rolling grandfathering and 
the static allocation. 
  15be lowest, if they would have no intertemporal transfer of permits. The results obtained from 
our numerical example suggest, that companies selling permits can exert market power and 
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Figure 7. The net present costs of emission reduction with and without intertemporal transfer 
of permits for the two dynamic allocation schemes. For companies 1 and 2 the intertemporal 
transfer is restricted to γ=0.2. All other companies have no intertemporal transfer of permits 
(γ=0). 
 
7 Discussion and conclusion 
This paper considers dynamic aspects of allocating greenhouse gas emission permits. We 
examine three different allocation approaches, one is static while the other two are dynamic. 
We extend the analysis to investigate two different mechanism to steer overall emission 
reduction. The regulator can either set the price of emission reduction or set the overall 
emission reduction target. 
We show that different approaches create different strategic incentives at present. With 
respect to emission reduction efforts rolling grandfathering is best for companies with high 
abatement costs. Companies with low abatement costs would prefer a technology standard. 
Also, the two mechanisms to steer overall emission reduction are not equivalent. If the permit 
price is set such that it takes the same value for all approaches rolling grandfathering becomes 
the least expensive approach. The reason is that the total emission reduction obligations 
would be smaller (greater) under rolling grandfathering (technology standard) compared to a 
static allocation.  
Expanding the model to include intertemporal transfer of permits through banking and 
borrowing the model becomes difficult to handle. The challenge is to solve a system where 
the permit price becomes arbitraged over time by different factors, the dynamic allocation 
scheme and the intertemporal transfer of permits. We therefore restrict banking and 
borrowing. We show that depending on the allocation approach, a companies abatement costs 
and the emission reduction target banking or borrowing might decrease costs. Intertemporal 
transfer of permits seems to be benefitial especially for companies with low abatement costs. 
  16The permit sellers on the market. Interestingly, the two dynamic approaches create opposite 
incentives. The same company would borrow permits under a system of rolling 
grandfathering and bank permits under a technology standard. As the EU is going to leave it 
to their member states to decide on how to allocate permits nationally (EU Commission, 
2003), this is likely to effect the market not only nationally. 
The analysis presented here needs extension in at least two directions. Firstly, emission 
reduction in period 1 may lead to lower emissions in a later period. This would be the case if 
investments in emission saving technology have a longer life-time than the policy period. For 
example, power plants have life-times of 30-50 years, while the UNFCCC commitment 
periods are 10-15 years. In our model, this implies that the effective emission reduction in 
period 2 is lower because of emission reduction in period 1. Secondly, more periods than two 
should be considered. Thirdly, the implementation of banking and borrowing is somewhat 
unsatisfactory. We are able to derive full results for the corner solution only. Fourthly, the 
interactions between dynamic target setting and incentives to invest in research and 
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Rolling grandfathering and banking and borrowing  
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Technology standards and banking and borrowing 
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The first order conditions of (A4) are: 
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Pi,t (A6c) and Bi,t (A6d) are not determined. 
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Banking and borrowing constrained 
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Rolling grandfathering and banking and borrowing constrained 
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Technology standard and banking and borrowing constrained 
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